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In this study, we investigate the extent of polarisation among theist versus atheist groups on Arab Twitter and
their networks. We find four main self-identified groups of Arab users that can be distinguished by different
attitudes to religion. In addition to Atheists and Theists, there are Rationalists, who promote rational thinking
regardless of religious affiliation, and Tanweeri, who promote religious reforms. Through a keyword search of
Twitter account handles and biographies, we identified 2,673 active, public Twitter accounts that clearly state
whether they are Atheists, Theists, Tanweeri or Rationalists and analysed the interactions among themselves
and the accounts that are followed, retweeted, or mentioned the most in their networks. Depending on the
network analysed, we found between four and seven sub-communities that highlight the rich socio-cultural
context in which discussions of religion, non-religion, and religious reform unfold. While there was clear
online polarisation between atheists and theists, Rationalist and Tanweeri accounts are spread among the two
polarised sides, acting as natural bridges. We also found a clear separation between Arab atheists who engage
with Arab accounts promoting atheism and those who primarily engage with Western accounts promoting
atheism. We discuss implications for the study of religious debate and religious polarisation on social media.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Arabs actively discuss religious beliefs and political views over social networks [3, 6, 52, 53]. In
the last decade, Arabs have become increasingly polarised along a spectrum ranging from actively
promoting non-belief (atheism) to actively promoting religious beliefs that are considered extreme
or fundamentalist in the Arab world [6, 39]. It is not clear what leads to the rise of active atheists
in Arab social media. Some researchers have suggested that this polarisation might be due to the
spread of social media and the crises that followed the failed Arab spring [39, 53], which may
encourage atheists to speak out more.
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While there is a substantial body of work on political polarisation in the online Arab world
[18, 52], relatively little is known about the ways in which religious polarisation manifests itself in
networks of social media users.
In this study, we aim to empirically investigate the social dynamics in online Arab communities
that adhere to various levels of religiosity and non-religiosity. While there is obviously a political
dimension to these religious issues as well, we believe that it is useful and necessary to clearly
focus on religious views in order to reveal the rich tapestry of online Arab belief and non-belief.
We use Twitter, because there is a rich literature on the expression of religious and political views
on this platform, especially in the Arab world [3, 6, 8, 52].
Our main research goal is to establish whether there is polarisation between Arab Twitter users
on different ends of the religiosity spectrum, and to characterise the extent of this polarisation.
Specifically, we investigate three main research questions:
RQ1 What are the relevant communities of Twitter users, and where do they fall on the spectrum
of religiosity?
RQ2 Do these communities form echo chambers or they have bridges between them?
RQ3 What is the nature of the networks that each of these religion-related communities interact
with?
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates religious polarisation between
theists and atheists on Arab Twitter, without limiting itself to a particular region or country, and
without a focus on hate speech or particular sub-communities. We perform a comprehensive
search of Twitter biographies to identify Arab Twitter users who actively talk about matters of
belief and non-belief and use network analysis to show how these users engage with each other
and with the communities around them. While most previous work on polarisation focused on
analysing the retweet network among users, in our study, we investigate three types of networks
for our studied communities: follow network (the accounts they follow), retweet network (the
accounts they retweet), and mention network (the accounts they reply and mention in their tweets).
This network analysis adds an important sociocultural dimension to the analysis. It situates those
accounts in the wider context of Arab and Western social media, and allows us to surface relevant
political discussions that go beyond advocating for religious fundamentalism.
As our starting point, we distinguish four categories of users, based on their self-identification
in their Twitter biography. Three of those categories are derived from a previous study [6], while
the fourth emerged from the analysis of Twitter biographies.
Atheists: This category includes users who clearly show that they do not practice any specific
religion. This group also includes those who used to adhere to an organised religion, such
as ex-Muslims and ex-Christians, and who do not self-identify as having changed religious
affiliation.
Theists: This category includes users who clearly state that they belong to an organised
religion, and promote that religion. Unlike Tanweeri, they are not reformist.
Tanweeris: This category, introduced in [6], includes the accounts that described themselves








K). Tanweeri might adhere to an organised religion,
but demand or support reforms or changes.
Rationalists: This category consists of theist and atheist users who clearly label themselves





®«) in their Twitter biography. They emphasise rational and logical
discussion of diverging points of view.
Our analysis of the networks of 2,673 users and the accounts they follow, mention and retweet,
shows that there are 4–7 more or less clearly delineated sub-communities of users, depending on
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the type of interaction that is used to build the networks. All analyses show that while largely
theist and largely atheist communities are indeed polarised echo chambers. Across networks, we
also find that the Arab atheist community on Twitter are not one coherent body. A portion of this
community is connected more to the western world and has most of their interactions to non-Arab
users, creating a clear echo-chamber that is isolated from all the Arab communities online, including
other Arab atheists.
Our findings also indicate that while polarisation based on religion does exist on Twitter, there
are natural bridges between the two opposite echo chambers, which allows for fruitful interactions
and clear discussions on certain topics when it comes to religion. Tanweeri and Rationalists act
as bridges between those communities, stoking the debates and facilitating interaction between
diverging points of view. Thus, in order to understand the complex online dynamics of religious
discussion on Arab Twitter, it is important to acknowledge the role of the comparatively small
Tanweeri and Rationalist communities who reflect the rich diversity of thought in the Arab world
in general and Islam in particular.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Religiosity and Non-Religiosity
For the purpose of this paper, we define religion as a “complex cultural and social framework”
[36][p. 126] that is built around spiritual experiences. This definition highlights religions as social
organisations, and allows us to draw parallels with other forms of online polarisation by organisa-
tion, such as political polarisation. Partially following Buie [29], we see spirituality as a person’s
relationship with the transcendent, that which is larger than oneself, with basic values that give
life meaning. The transcendent does not have to be linked to a deity; it is perfectly possible to be
spiritual, but not religious, and without belief in any divine beings.
People’s attitudes to religion vary depending on their own spirituality, their experiences of living
within a religion, and their views of people who follow other religions or accept different doctrines.
Intolerance of different religions or variations in doctrine is a major source of armed conflict. For
an overview of the major sects and divisions in Islam, see [46]. Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam
is a monotheist religion that postulates a single, supernatural deity, with the power to intervene in
the human realm. Traditionally, those who are not religious have been classified according to their
views about the existence of such a deity.
Atheists deny the existence of God, gods, or other spiritual beings [10], while agnostics claim
that one cannot be certain whether such entities or beings exist [10, 37, 38]. Finally, deists believe
that there is God who created the universe, but that this creator does not influence its course or
directly interferes in human affairs. This also means that the Creator cannot contact humans or
reveal holy doctrine [48]. Deists may be part of a religion that worships the Creator.
However, non-belief in a deity is only one way to characterise the varieties of non-religious
experience [14, 42]. In 1874, Charles Bradlaugh [19] argued that atheism is “no mere disbelief”;
instead, it is “a hearty, fruitful affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion of action
of highest humanity”. Bradlaugh posits that atheists cannot reject God’s existence, because to them,
the concept of a God is not meaningful.
The non-religious share common ground with the religious in movements such as secularism,
which emphasises the separation of religion and state and humanism, which emphasises human
rights and asserts the value of all human beings. Other non-religious groups consider organised
religion to be actively harmful, and take a strong anti-religious stance.
For the purpose of this paper, atheist users are those who describe themselves in their account
biography as as agnostics, atheists, non-believers, or Deist. Although it is more complicated to
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consider all of these as one group from anthropological and social prospects, we consider them as
one group as they all share the same idea of doubting or rejecting religions that posit that there is a
Creator who can connect with humans.
Previous work in HCI and CSCW on technology, religion, and spirituality has focused on three
main aspects, leveraging technology for worship and adherence to religious practices [5, 27, 54, 56,
57], using technology to mediate transcendent experiences [29], and supporting social action that
is linked to religion [43]. This study provides important background for the first aspect, technology
for supporting religious practices.
2.2 Influential Users Among Twitter
The importance of influential users in the social media context are understood to be from their roles
to generate and diffuse ideas, to promote knowledge, and to attract attention and interactions of
users from different backgrounds to engage in discussions [1, 2, 12, 17, 44]. Hence, identifying the
influencers and understanding their influence on others helps to understand the online behaviours
of individuals and communities, and how information spreads within these communities.
For example, the work by Abidin and Ots [2] analyse social media influencers who joined
campaigns aiming to discredit telecommunications providers in Singapore. They see how influencers
can lead to trends that might be unethical or deceiving. They highlight that influencers and their
followers are sensitive to what they experience as deceptive and unethical behaviours that put
normative pressures onto the influencers to conform to certain ethical standards. This even extends
to affect the brand clients they talk about.
In our study, we study the accounts that are followed, mentioned and retweeted the most by
different religious group. We notice that some of these accounts are influencers in different areas,
such as politics or culture.
2.3 Religious Discussions On Twitter
Similar to other technologies, web 2.0 and social media networks are widely used by people to
broadcast their messages, communicate with their followers and to update the public with their
projects, events and publications [20, 22, 24].
Previous work has examined kind of content religious versus non-religious people post on
Twitter, and what sentiments they express[23, 45]. Using linguistic analysis tools, Ritter et al. [45]
showed that Christians on Twitter presented as happier, more socially connected, but less reflective.
Since influential accounts have an ever more noticeable impact on society [20–22, 24], another
line of research focuses on the way leaders and influences leverage religious discourse. Burge et
al. [22] studied how U.S. evangelical leaders used Twitter by analysing more than 85,000 tweets
published by 88 American prominent evangelical leaders. The authors found that these leaders use
their accounts to communicate with their followers, to disseminate sermons, and to share their
events and news.
Political parties also co-opt religious discourse. Bramlett and Burge [20] investigated whether the
members of American Congress use religious language in their tweets by analysing about 1.5 million
tweets posted by them in April 2018. The authors found that members from both major political
parties, i.e. Democratic and Republican, use religious language in their social media accounts.
2.4 Religious Discussions Among Arab Twitter Users
There are relatively few studies of religious discussions between Arabs on social media that do not
focus on hate speech or political extremism.
Social media is an important forum of discussions for Muslims who wish to talk about aspects of
faith and practice. As Echchaibi [28] notes in her study of blogs, it can be a form of constructive
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dissent, where writers develop nuanced positions that promote reform. It can also be a safe space
for Muslims to reflect on their own practice in predominantly non-Muslim contexts. An example is
the online reaction to the French ban on Burkinis, a swimsuit for Muslim women that incorporates
the hijab [30]. In their online spaces, Muslim women develop and elaborate on the meaning of the
religious practice of wearing hijab as part of their own identity [35].
Another aspect of discussing religious content on Twitter that should be highlighted here is
citing the Quran. A recent study by Abokhodair et al. [3] analysed mentions of the Quran verses in
about 2.6 million Arabic tweets. The study shows that users extend their real-life religious practices
and worship acts by sharing Quran verses as a form of religious expression.
The study that is most similar to the current work is [6]. In that study, the authors analysed the
stance towards religion of 434 Arabic accounts that engaged with a seed list of 80 influential Arabic
accounts that discuss religion and atheism. Qualitative analysis of account name, biography, and
timeline yielded four main categories of users: atheist, theist, tanweeri and other (no clear position).
These accounts are identified starting from 80 seed accounts who believed to be influential users and
discuss religions and atheism among Arabs online. Afterwards, about 1.3 million tweets published
by these accounts are used to extract the main topics discussed and the network interaction among
them. The intermediate categories established by Al-Hariri et al. fit well with the complex landscape
of religious and non-religious thought discussed earlier. Although [6] is the first study to shed light
on these communities and their contents in the online Arab societies, it is limited due to the size
of network and the labelling method, which relies on human annotators identifying the Twitter
users’ attitude towards religion and atheism. Indeed, some might argue that labelling the contents
of accounts might lead to labelling users which clearly affects their privacy. The study also does
not consider links between relevant communities.
2.5 Religious Polarisation in Arab Twitter
A form of religious polarisation that has received a lot of attention is religious hate speech. Albadi
et al. [8] studied six categories of Arab Twitter users who can be identified as Muslims, Jews,
Christians, Atheists, Sunnis, and Shia. The authors found that hateful language was very common
in their sample of Arab tweets with religious content. The most targeted groups are found to be
Jews, Atheists and Shia.
The study which is perhaps closest to ours is Weber et al.’s [52] quantitative analysis of the
polarisation between secular and Islamist Twitter users in Egypt. The authors expanded an initial
manually labelled seed list of 22 politicians and prominent users from both groups by using
retweeting interaction to have about 7,000 accounts. Then they studied the top topics discussed
by the two groups and measured how they are polarised by computing the valence of hashtags
used in tweets published by their members. They found that hashtags published by both political
sides could be used as polarisation barometer as it coincided with periods of violent events. They
showed that followers of accounts on the Islamist side are more likely to use Islamic terms and
charitable terms, and were less likely to use derogatory terms and hate speech when talking about
followers of other religions.
2.6 Contribution of Present Study
In comparison to the previous literature, and in particular [6] and [52], our study provides an
in-depth analysis of network polarisation on Arab Twitter as it relates to religion. While Weber et
al.[52] also studied network polarisation between secular and non-secular groups, they did not
expand their analysis to non-political contexts, and they restricted themselves to Egypt. In our study,
we consider Arab Twitter in general as they discuss topics relevant to their own beliefs whatever
their political positions. Unlike [6], we consider accounts that clearly declare their positions, and
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study their interactions, paying more attention to influential accounts and those that have been
verified by Twitter. We formally analyse the following, retweeting, and mentioning interactions to
understand the polarisation between these communities, and sample a wider collection of accounts
which give more relevant information about such communities.
3 DATA COLLECTION AND METHOD
Identifying the non-religious community in the Arab countries is difficult, since atheism is either
illegal or heavily socially sanctioned in the Arab World. Therefore, it is almost impossible to find
representative organisations. However, as we have seen, non-religious Arabs are active on social
media, such as Twitter [6, 52]. Therefore, following earlier work, we used seed accounts to identify
relevant religious and non-religious communities on Twitter. While Facebook might be more
popular in some Arabic countries (especially north Africa), we conduct our study on Twitter, since
it is more open platform where data collection of public posts could be easily collected using their
API, unlike Facebook, which is highly restricted and data collection is not allowed. In addition, as
shown in previous section, most of literature applied to Arabic social media was applied on Twitter,
and thus our study here continues in the same direction.
Data collection was performed over two stages. Initially, we identified the relevant accounts that
disclose their position towards religion. Then we expanded the data set by adding the accounts
that they follow or interacted with.
3.1 Ethical Issues
Discussing non-religion is sensitive, especially in the Arab and Muslim communities. During this
study, we took several measures to protect Twitter users’ identities. First, we focused on users who
clearly stated their religious orientation in their Twitter biographies at the time of data collection.
Secondly, we do not perform any statistical analysis to infer information about these accounts,
such as gender, that they do not wish to disclose themselves. When we talk about people behind
individual accounts, these are either verified by Twitter or well-known figures with a public and
social media profile across several platforms. Finally, most sample tweets provided are either slightly
rephrased (for English tweets) or translated (for Arab tweets). We only provide original tweets
where the user tweeted a headline together with a link to a web page. We also note that individuals’
religious beliefs change - accounts may be deleted, Tweets may be deleted, and authors may modify
their biographies to highlight changes in belief or loss of belief.
In terms of the positionality of the authors of this paper, the research team consists of Arab
Muslims and a non-Arab Christian who has had extensive exposure to Atheism, in particular New
Atheism [50].
3.2 Collecting the Seed-list Data Set
In order to answer RQ1 (identifying relevant communities of Twitter users), we searched for
Twitter users who explicitly state their position toward religions in the screen names, user names
or descriptions (bios) of their Twitter account. To do so, we compiled a list of Arabic terms that
can be used to reflect a relevant position towards religions, and refuting or challenging others’
beliefs. We considered all the different morphological forms that can be derived of these terms,
since Arabic is one of the most inflected languages and one term can have many morphological







®« (Rationalists) and PðAjÖÏ @_ é«A 	J (Creating_the_interlocutor), which are both used
in atheism/religion debates according to [6]. When choosing keywords for theist accounts, we
found that using generic terms such as Muslim, Christian, or believer, yielded a large number of
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Table 1. Sample of the core terms used to search for profiles. For each term all variations are also used,
including the singular/plural and masculine/feminine versions. List on the right are references to atheist
usually used by those refuting atheism.
irrlevant accounts, since many Arab Twitter users add their religion in their account descriptions
even though they don’t talk about their beliefs in their timeline. In total we compiled a set of 118
terms. Table 1 shows few examples of the terms used along with their translations.
This set of 118 terms was then used to search user profiles that has any of them in the profile
name or description. We used Followerwonk1, which is an online tool that allows searching user
profiles and screen names, which is a functionality not available through the Twitter API.
Our search process retrieved a set of 5,010 Twitter accounts that use at least one of the selected
terms in their profile.
The first author, a native Arabic speaker, analysed profile names and descriptions to exclude
irrelevant accounts and assign relevant accounts to one of four categories: Atheist, Theist, Tanweeri,
and Rationalist. Irrelevant accounts were retrieved for several reasons. Most of the Arabic tokens
are homonyms, in which the same token might give different meanings depending on the context







®« (rationalist) is used in different contexts such as personal names (mainly surnames),
sports and football clubs, social relations in addition to the religious context.
More drastically, some accounts used the term atheism in the sport context. For example, some
accounts’ descriptions state that "Atheism in football is to deny the historical leadership of a specific
football club".
After this process, a set of 2,356 (47.02%) accounts remained as relevant. We then collected the
network of the 2,356 accounts, which was defined as all accounts that these users followed and
interacted with by retweeting, replying, or mentioning. We then searched the profiles of those
accounts for any of our 118 terms to be sure that nothing might have been missed by FollowerWonk.
We retrieved 520 accounts which belonged to one of the four categories.
From this set of 2876 accounts, we removed those that had no tweets in their timelines or not
connected to other accounts on Twitter. Our final set of accounts included a total of 2,673 (92.95%)
Twitter accounts. We call this set of accounts our seed list.
3.3 Network Analysis Methodology
In this section, we present our methodology for constructing and analysing the social media
networks of Arab Twitter users from different religious affiliations. In order to answer RQ2 and
RQ3, we analysed how our four religious communities interact with each other and the nature of
network of influential users each of them is located within.
Constructing the Follow, Retweet, and Mention Networks. According to Aldayel and Magdy [9], there
are three types of networks for each social media user:
1https://followerwonk.com
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(1) the connection network (CN), which represents the network of accounts the user is connected
to;
(2) the interaction network (IN), which represents the network of accounts the user interact
with through retweeting and replying;
(3) the preference network (PN), which are the accounts mentioned in the posts (tweets) the
user likes.
It was shown that these networks can be predictive to users’ views and beliefs [9]. Thus, in our
study, we decided to analyse the CN and IN networks of accounts of our dataset. Particularly, we
are interested in analysing the accounts that our groups follow (the follow network), those they
retweet their posts (the retweet network), and those they mention/reply in their tweets (the mention
network). The follow network is part of CN, while the retweet and mention networks are part of IN.
For each of the 2,673 seed list accounts, we collected the list of accounts they follow and their
timelines, which contain all the accounts they have retweeted and mentioned/replied. The seed list
accounts follow 550,238 Twitter accounts, retweet 142,880 accounts at least once , and mention or
reply to a further 142,472 accounts at least once. We call these accounts network accounts.
The majority of these network accounts are followed, retweeted, or mentioned by only one of
the seed list accounts, which means that the network will be highly sparse if plotted. In addition,
an account that only a few of our seed accounts interact with may not be relevant. Finally, very
large, sparse networks can be difficult to interpret. Thus, we used thresholds to ensure that the
accounts in our follow, retweet, and mention networks are relevant to several of the users in our
seed list. For the follow network, we included accounts that were followed by at least 20 seed
list accounts; for the retweet network, we included accounts that were retweeted at least once
from at least 10 seed list accounts; and for themention network, we chose accounts that were
mentioned or replied to by at least 20 seed list accounts.
After applying these restrictions led to filtering out the majority of the accounts in the network,
the size of the follow network is 5,150 accounts, the size of the retweet network is 5,404 accounts,
and the size of the mention network is 7,707 accounts.
To ensure that the resulting network analysis was not unduly skewed by these thresholds, we
performed all analyses both with and without thresholding. Since the clusters generated in both
instances were very similiar, we report only the findings generated with thresholding, as they are
easier to visualise and interpret.
3.4 Analysing the Follow, Retweet, and Mention Networks
In our analysis, we focus on the nature, influence, and the position of our seed accounts among the
follow network, the retweet network, and the mention network.
We apply a graphical network visualisation to our seed accounts and their follow, retweet, and
mention networks. We use Gephi2, which is an open source software for network analysis and
statistical measurements for graphs with visualisation capabilities [13]. To generate the network
graphs, we use the default values of most of the parameters of Gephi. The layout algorithm that we
use is ForceAtlas 2 [34], with setting the scaling and gravity as 10 and 1 respectively. To identify the
sub-communities within the follow and retweet networks, we used the modularity algorithm [16].
We conducted several experiments to select the settings that produce reasonable and harmonious
communities. To perform that, we manually investigate the resulted sub-communities for each
experiment. With harmonious communities we mean maximising the number of nodes in each
cluster, minimising the number of clusters, and grouping the majority of public and well known
2https://gephi.org/
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accounts within a similar featured group with least modifications for the default parameters of
Gephi’s functions.
For the follow network, we computed themodularity by using different values within the suggested
range by the authors, i.e. [0.1 - 2], and studied the resulted communities for these values. We found
that a resolution of 0.75 gives us the reasonable communities in which the majority of the large
component nodes, i.e. the well connected accounts, in each community share similar characteristics.
For the retweet and mention networks, we used the default value for the modularity resolution,
that is 1. Experiments show no substantial differences in the result when we used different values
to cluster the communities.
The final follow network graph has 0.063, 0.435 and 11 for average clustering coefficient, modu-
larity and diameter, respectively. The mention network graph has 0.058, 0.692 and 14 for average
clustering coefficient, modularity and diameter, respectively. Finally, the retweet network graph
has 0.035, 0.485 and 19 for average clustering coefficient, modularity and diameter, respectively.
For the three networks we plot the network graph twice, once including our seed accounts only,
to measure the connection among them, and another one with their follow, retweet, or mention
networks to visualise the distribution of the different clusters of accounts in these networks, as
shown in the next section in Figures 2, 3, and 4.
Network Interpretation. The first author interpreted the resulting cluster using a combination of
qualitative and quantitative approaches. For the follower and retweet network, he researched
publicly available information about account owner, including checking their official web-page, and
watching a few of their online video/lectures (where applicable). These systematic observations
were distilled into an overall theme for each cluster and checked in supervision meetings with the
second and third author.
For the mention network, we were interested in the topics of the tweets where the accounts
were mentioned or replied to. Our quantitative and qualitative analysis methodology is different
here from previous two networks, where here we inspect the tweets themselves that have the
mentions and replies to extract the main topic of discussion and name the cluster accordingly in
Table 8. Since there are a large number of tweets in each cluster, we applied a topic extraction
using LDA [15]. First, we extracted all tweets by the seed list accounts that mention or reply to a
member of the mention network. Tweet texts were pre-processed by removing special characters
(except the At-sign and the hash tag sign) and URLs and converted into input for LDA using a
TFIDF vectorizer. LDA was performed using the implementation in the Python package GenSim 3
to extract the top five topics for each cluster. Topics were named based on the representative words.
4 RQ1: COMMUNITIES OF TWITTER USERS THAT DEBATE RELIGION
The 2,673 accounts in our seed list data set are distributed among the four religious groups as
shown in Table 2. Almost half of the accounts belong to the atheist group while 26% and 21% belong
to the theist and the Rationalist groups respectively. The Tanweeri group has the smallest number
of accounts, where only 5% of the accounts belong to it. This biased distribution towards atheist
accounts could be expected, since most of the search terms we used for collection have focused on
the atheism topic. Thus, the theist accounts in our collection are those who mention they refute
atheism in specific in their profile.
We further manually labelled the theist accounts to classify their religion. Annotation was based
on what users explicitly mention in their profile, or what we can infer from what they share on
their timeline (such as verses of Quran or Bible). As shown in Table 2, the vast majority of the
3https://pypi.org/project/gensim/
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Table 2. Distribution of categories (left) and religions represented in the theist group (right) in our seed list
dataset.
Group Bio (Translated)
Atheist Before #Atheism, I was a miserable, disobedient, passive person, with goalless life and I am
eventually going to hell... #Now I am a new person, optimistic #lover_of_life... I will leave my
mark and #go_away. #Agnostic
Atheist I try not to think, but I find myself thinking; how I stop thinking? I insult the religion twice,
and atheism once, I belong to humanity, not religion, not belief nor theory.
Theist I seek refuge in God from every atheist, and I seek refuge in God from anyone who follows
other than Islam .. (Guide us to the straight path) Yes, really it is my religion the religion of
truth.
Theist Atheism is a void that must be filled with a religion someday! ... Religion is a human need...
there are cities without education, but there are no cities without temples!
Rationalist A rationalist, interested in science and philosophy, interested in freedom and equality, human
rights activist, and freelance writer.
Rationalist Rational, taciturn, music-loving, sportive.
Tanweeri Tanweeri religious researcher (masculine). Columnist, I wait for the mind’s winning day.
Tanweeri Tanweeri (feminine)... Before you argue, test your axioms by looking impartially at the
opinions of its dissenters.
Table 3. Samples of biography description of the Twitter accounts from the four groups in our dataset
theist group belongs to Islam with two out of them mentioning in their profiles that they are Jihadi;
32 accounts are Christians, three Hindus and one Jewish.
The most frequently mentioned terms in the biographies of the atheist group include atheism,
non-religious, humanist, rationalist, secularist, ex-Muslim, and Liberal. The rationalist group use
both terms that are relevant to their belief about rationalism in general, suhc as thoughts, thinker,
and logic, as well as more passionate and emotional terms such as lover, love, hate, and poet. A few
members of this group also show their support of certain Arabic football clubs. Tanweeri accounts
use more terms relevant to enlightenment (as verb and noun forms). They often use the terms
liberal, society, world, educated, Saudi, parody, religion, and peace. The most frequent terms used
by Theist accounts are atheists (plural form in specific, especially the version èYgCÖÏ @, which is a
sarcastic plural version of atheists in Arabic, unlike the normal version 	àðYjÊÖÏ @), atheism, Islam,
PðAjÖÏ @_ é«A 	J (Creating_the_interlocutor, an online academy that teaches how to refute atheism
and non-religiosity), Christian, Jesus and conservative.
Table 3 shows a sample of the bios (translated to English) of the accounts in our seed list data set
along with their corresponding category.
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(a) Gender/Type Distributions (b) Locations Distributions
(c) Countries with Most Ac-
counts
Fig. 1. Distributions for Dataset Accounts
Demographics. We extracted information about account type, gender, and location from the account
descriptions. We used gender and location information specified by the Twitter users themselves,
even though we are aware that they may be misleading, since giving a false gender or location
might be a conscious, privacy-preserving choice. The type of the account is either a person or a
page, where page accounts includes those that represent companies, organisation, campaigns or
groups of interest, such as accounts for groups promoting or refuting religion/atheism. When the
account looks to be representing a person, we label the gender of the person if it is clearly stated in
the account’s description and/or name as male, female or transgender; otherwise, it will be labelled
as unclear, such as accounts using nicknames.
Location is identified by using the location field of the account profile, if it exists and indicates
a meaningful location. Many accounts have empty location field or meaningless locations (e.g.
"hellfire") [33]. When the account mentions multiple locations in their profile (e.g. "Saudi Arabia
and USA"), we consider the Arab country or the first mentioned one.
Figure 1 summarises the demographics of our seed list. As shown in Figure 1a, the majority of
the accounts holders in our collection are male (55%), while less than 20% are female. This ratio
is almost consistent across all account groups. Three of the atheist accounts mentioned they are
transgender in their profiles. The remaining accounts (around 20%) do not provide clear gender
information in their profile. Around 200 of the accounts are pages, mainly promoting atheism, while
a small percentage of those are refuting atheism or representing rational and Tanweeri groups.
As shown in Figure 1b, the majority of the accounts (over 60%) do not share their location. For
those who have stated a meaningful location, the majority of them are living in Arabic countries,
which is expected since we focused on Arabic terms when searching for those accounts. Small
percentage were found to be living in North America and Europe. Figure 1c lists the top 10 countries
identified for the accounts. Saudi Arabia (KSA) has the largest number of accounts, followed by
Egypt, USA, Iraq, and Kuwait. It can be noticed that the atheist accounts have lower percentage in
KSA, Egypt, and UAE, unlike the general distribution of those accounts in our collection and in
the other locations. This might be due to several factors, such as restrictive laws, stigma against
atheism in these countries. It is also possible that atheists living in these countries prefer not to
share their location.
5 RQ2 AND RQ3 ECHO CHAMBERS, BRIDGES, AND NETWORK STRUCTURES
In this section, we describe the network analysis results for the follow network, the retweet network,
and the mention network. For each network, we describe the nature of the clusters that constitute
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(a) The follow connections among our seed ac-
counts. Node colors represent each group in our
dataset.
(b) The follow connections among the seed ac-
counts and their Follow network. Nodes colors
represent different clusters obtained based on
modularity
Fig. 2. Visualisation of the follow connections among our data set and their network, including only accounts
followed by 20 or more of the seed list. Description of cluster names is provided in Table 4
the network and identify echo chambers and bridges. We conclude by discussing the intersection
between all three networks.
5.1 The Follow Network
Figure 2 shows the network representation of the follow network among our seed list (2a), and
among our seed list and their follow network (2b).
Network Clusters. Seven clusters emerged from the analysis. The characterisation of each cluster is
summarised in Table 4. Below, we describe each cluster in more detail.
ArbAth: Arab Atheists. Most of the seed list accounts in this group are Arab atheists. Overall, the
accounts in this group promote atheism, view religions as irrational, and criticise traditions, and
cultural values of Arab religious communities. They tend to follow Arab and non-Arab atheists from
the groups RelDis and NonArab. The personal accounts in this group tend to use names that show
their origins or affiliations such as mol7d_Arabi4 (meaning: An Arab atheist), _PROMETHEUS_15,
ArabIrreligious, and so on. Also, the screen names of non-seed list accounts tend to reflect atheist
affiliations and stances such as CurseOfIslam, AngryEgyptian1 and BigLieReligon. Some accounts
criticise religions, and promote secularism without reflecting their affiliation such as aba_akrama,
or with declaring their position such as Liberal_Infidel.
This cluster also tends to follow accounts which tweet about science, knowledge and exploration
without mentioning any affiliation in their timeline such as youssefalbanay from Kuwait, and
ScientificSaudi from Saudi Arabia. There are some non popular theist users that follow atheist
accounts whether to criticise atheism or to criticise other religions such as SaudiChrstian93 and
SaudiChristian who describe themselves as ex-Muslim Christians and criticise Islam. This cluster
4This name written by using Arabizi which is a form of writing Arabic in Latin letters, numbers and punctuation rather
than Arabic letters
5Prometheus is the name of one of Titans which is believed to be one of the supreme tricksters in Greek religion, and a god
of fire [41].
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Cluster Theme (name) Description
ArbAth Arabic Atheists Arab atheists and secularists tied more strongly to non-Arab
atheists
RelDis Discussion of Religion Arab atheists and secularists group, linked more strongly to
non-religious Arabs
ArbInfl Prominent Arabic Accounts Most influential Arabs
NonArab Non-Arabic & Western Non-Arabic accounts that are critical of religion
ArbSch Arab & Islamic Scholars Arab accounts that promote religion
News News & Journalists International public figures, politics, singers
Info Infotainment Regular non-influential Arabs and entertainment personalities
Table 4. Cluster Themes for the Seven Groups in the Follow Network
Cluster Total Seed list Non-Seed
Size Atheist Rationalist Tanweeri Theist list
ArbAth 941 447 (47.5%) 29 (3.1%) 15 (1.6%) 59 (6.3%) 391 (41.6%)
RelDis 910 299 (32.9%) 9 (1.0%) 11 (1.2%) 68 (7.5%) 523 (57.5%)
ArbInfl 850 17 (2.0%) 92 (10.8%) 26 (3.1%) 182 (21.4%) 533 (62.7%)
NonArab 733 316 (43.1%) 25 (3.4%) 3 (0.4%) 10 (1.4%) 379 (51.7%)
ArbSch 649 8 (1.2%) 269 (41.4%) 25 (3.9%) 25 (3.9%) 322 (49.6%)
News 634 116 (18.3%) 55 (8.7%) 21 (3.3%) 84 (13.2%) 358 (56.5%)
Info 433 15 (3.5%) 96 (22.2%) 7 (1.6%) 39 (9.0%) 276 (63.7%)
Table 5. Distribution of Accounts Followed by dataset Accounts
also contains some controversial personal accounts such as MaysAlsuwaidan, HsnFrhanALmalki,
TurkiHAlhamad1 andMadawiDr, who usually discuss sensitive topics related to secularism that grab
public attention and create online debates. While all of these accounts demand secular communities,
some of them strongly support their governments such as TurkiHAlhamad1, others criticise it and
demand political reforms such as MadawiDr.
RelDis: Discussion of Religion. As for ArbAth, atheists are the majority in RelDis and theists
are a minority. The majority of this group tend to be actively promoting atheism and criticise
religions such as DrTalebJawad, SherifGaber and hamed_samad. Also, in this cluster we found
some Israeli accounts who tweet in Arabic such as IsraelArabic and EdyCohen. This group also
actively campaigns for secular societies founded on rationalist principles. Some accounts do not
declare their personal affiliations. Some of these accounts show their belonging to or solidarity
with the LGBTQ community, such as LGBTQarabic.
A good example of a RelDis account is Na9eR_Dashti, which is the account of Naser Dashti,
a well known Kuwaiti secular activist who actively discusses his point of view with others with
respecting their rights to practice whatever they want as that does not harm others. In an interview6,
Dashti states that he is a secularist and that he believes in the logic of reasoning and science in
the areas of science, culture and even politics; but, according to him, faith is a spiritual experience
for individual. While this group have well-known accounts who discuss religions and atheism,
such as jaafarAbdulKari, hamed_samad and DrTalebJawad, it includes some satirical accounts that
mock principles of religions, mainly Islam, such as OwaisMaqdesi, TwiceThinker, Suhaibfather,
and shikh_elroibda.
Like ArbAth, RelDis includes science accounts by known scientists such as NidhalGuessoum, a
verified account of an ex-researcher in NASA and tweets a lot about science and astronomy; and
6https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63wURurp3hI
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other unknown such as SciTalk2U, IBelieveInSci, NasaInArabic and Arabic_Nasa. The latter two
accounts tweet in Arabic about exploration news from NASA but they are not verified by Twitter
nor officially linked to NASA.
ArbInfl: Influential Arabic Accounts. The third group, ArbInfl, contains accounts of non popular
seed list accounts. and the majority are rationalists; atheist accounts are the minority. In additon to
theist members, there are Tanweeri of two spectrums, religious and social reformers. These seed
list accounts tend to follow well known figures in the Arab communities and mainly from Arabian
peninsula (i.e. Arab Gulf countries, Yemen) and Iraq. This group includes number of accounts that
belong to members of royal families such as KingSalman, MohamedBinZayed and abdullahthanii,
popular individuals such as ministers from Saudi Arabia (AdelAljubeir), and Emirates (AnwarGar-
gash), journalists, writers, actors and shows presenters such as OlaAlfares and OthmanAlomeir;
the Saudi TV presenter nadinealbdear, which is one of the first Saudi women TV presenter who
demanded liberal society; poets (yasseraltwaijri), and singers (AhlamAlShamsi).
The cluster also contains official news sources such as spagov and AlArabiya_KSA; unofficial
news sources (ajlnews and AjelNews24); magazines, (Saco_KSA) and well known Saudi football
clubs exist in this group such as Alhilal_FC and AlNassrFC.
The scholars in this group are Islamic scholars or figures mainly from KSA and UAE such as
SalehAlmoghamsy and Waseem_Yousef, who are known with their support to Arabic governments;
academic members such as HatoonALFASSI and Abdulkhaleq_UAE; and some controversial tan-
weeri accounts such as Dr_Mhd_Shahrour, DrAdnanIbrahim and salrashed. While the first two
provide what they call new readings of Quran and Islamic principles, the latter discuss social
reforms and personal development topics.
NonArab: Non-Arabic and Western. Almost 75% of our seed list accounts in NonArab group
are atheist accounts such as CEMB_forum, ExmuslimsOrg and Bassamius. This group consists
mainly of Arabs and non-Arab ex-Muslims who are based in the West, who established or joined
organisations that aligned to their cases, and tweet about religions in Arab countries, Iran, Pakistan
and India. Oprah, and BillGates in addition to many others, and some non-Arabic media sources
such as AJEnglish and Reuters.
The accounts in this cluster include non-Arabic atheists/agnostics speakers and show presenters
(e.g. SamHarrisOrg), Western atheists/agnostics scientists (e.g. RichardDawkins), Arab immigrants
residing in the West (e.g. Ayaan), non-Arab Ex-Muslim immigrants who live in west (e.g. Maryam-
Namazie), non-Arab secular Muslim immigrants (e.g. MaajidNawaz), former presidents of the
United States (e.g. BarackObama and realDonaldTrump), non-Arabic religious person such as
DalaiLama (The highest spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism) and benshapiro, international official
organisations (hrw) and non-official organisations (HumanistsInt), Western popular figures such as
(JustinTrudeau); Israeli politics (netanyahu and IsraeliPM); US organisations (NASA and FBI); Tech-
nology companies (Microsoft and Facebook); and entertainment series such as GameOfThrones.
ArbSch: Arab and Islamic Scholars. The general theme of the cluster ArbSch is promoting religion
and refuting atheism. Interestingly it does not include many of the theist accounts in our seed list. It
contains verified accounts for famous Muslim scholars such as MohamadAlarefe; women academics
and Islamic scholars such as rokaya_mohareb_; Quran reciters such as Alafasy, poets such as
Dr_Ashmawi, Muslim academics, intellectuals, and thinkers of different topics such as LoveLiberty
(a specialist in political communication), Talhabeeb (consultant in psychiatry), MidoAlhajji (social
and behavioural science), TareqAlSuwaidan, (historian and specialist in management), drjasem
(social, educational and behavioural patterns specialist), mshinqiti (specialist in Islamic political
thought and ethics); and DrAlnefisi (Political thinker); political and social activists, members of
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parliaments, and whistleblowers from different backgrounds and different Arab countries that
demand political and social reforms such as saadalfagih, nasser_duwailah and mujtahidd; Islamic
studies centres, institutions, and programs that promote Islam and discuss or criticise atheism such
as takweencenter, Almohawer_T, and Wesal_TV. Also, this group contain some official Arabic news
source (AJABreaking), non-official news source (3ajel_ksa), infotainment accounts (naizaktv), and
Arab journalists and TV presenters such as Jkhashoggi and MousaAlomar.
In addition, there are personal accounts that impugn atheism and promote religious views
including popular Arab scholars (Dr_EyadQun, FadelSoliman, abosaleh95, and AhmadyuAlsayed),
or some pseudonymous accounts (Ex_AtheistGirL); We noticed some accounts that belong to Arab
political writers and activists (YZaatreh and EHSANFAKEEH), and specialists in technology who
use their social media to raise technological awareness among Arab users (CyberkovCEO and
Abdulaziz_Hmadi). The most interesting religious account in this cluster is PvGovSa, which is the
verified account of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in Saudi
Arabia.
News: News and Journalists. The majority of seed list accounts in the News group are atheists,
while both theists and tanweeri accounts are minorities. However, there are some noticeable theist
and rationalist accounts such as BrotherRasheed, an Ex-Muslim Christian who criticises Islam, and
hanyfreedom, who define himself as an atheist from Christian background. BrotherRasheed is well
known for his TV shows Let’s Be Clear and Daring Questions.
Where ArbInfl consisted of Arab influential figures and public accounts that are mostly fol-
lowed by theists, News represents those influential figures and public accounts that are mostly
followed by atheists. Specifically, the group consists of Arabic news sources and TV channels
(AJArabic and AlArabiya), and non Arabic media (CGTNOfficial). It also includes some Muslim
scholars (alqaradawy and DrAliGomaa), presidents and royal family members (TamimBinHamad,
KingAbdullahII, AlsisiOfficial, MuhammadMorsi and Israelipm_ar), Arabic political thinkers (ab-
delbariatwan and AzmiBishara), public Arab figures (walidjoumblatt, and ElBaradei), journalists,
writers and TV presenters (kasimf and FatimaNaoot), and symbolic accounts for writers and poets
(Mh_Darwish, Wam_Shakespeare).
It also includes some Western and international organisations that tweet in Arabic language such
as (USAbilAraby and hrw_ar) famous international professional football players, singers or show
presenters (MoSalah, Rihanna, Oprah and elissakh), Arab and international football clubs such as
(realmadrid and AlAhly), international football organisations (fifacom_ar), and Israeli accounts
(Israelipm_ar and AvichayAdraee).
Info: Infotainment. The last group, Info, has the majority from rationalist seed list accounts, while
atheist accounts are the minority. Some of the theist accounts in this group criticise non-religiosity
and organise ‘electronic attack’ against the atheist contents and accounts in Twitter such as (
Anti_Godlessnes and SalwaSsee). It seems that they work in groups as most of them share the same
hashtags é 	JË@_ 
k. # (Sunna’s Armay) and QÔ«_ 
k. # (Omar’s Army). Some theist accounts
only show their affiliation without showing any stance towards others such as saudi_raiq.
The accounts in this group tend to follow infotainment accounts such as AQWAL_MATHORA;
personal accounts with no direct stances towards affiliation from different Arab countries such as
Palestine (MustafAbuZir), Emirates (EMARATI___1), Saudi Arabia (adelmz44), Kuwait (AhmedAb-
dullahQ8), Yemen (7oppp); and non official news sources such as (aljadidnews). We notice that lots
of accounts in this group are suspended or deleted during the study and we find some bots that
broadcast Islamic supplications (TasbehEstigfar).
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(a) The retweeting interactions among our seed
accounts. Nodes colors represent each group in
our dataset.
(b) The retweeting interactions among the seed
accounts and their Retweet network. Nodes col-
ors represent different clusters obtained based on
modularity
Fig. 3. Visualisation of the retweet network among our data set and their network, including only accounts
retweeted by 10 or more of the seed list. Description of cluster names is provided in Table 6
Echo Chambers and Bridges. The general observation from Figure 2a is that the atheist group (in
pink) and the theist group (in green) are well separated into echo chambers, while the Tanweeri
(yellow) and Rationalist (blue) groups are spread between them, acting as a bridge. A small portion
of the atheist group is somewhat isolated from the majority, seen in the left part of the graph).
Similarly, a small portion of the theist group looks to be closer to the atheist group. This would be
better understood from analysing the clusters of communities obtained with the follow network.
When we look at the distribution of our seed list among the seven clusters (c.f. Table 5), a more
complex picture emerges The majority of Atheist group has been divided among three main clusters:
ArbAth, RelDis, and NonArab. Most of the Theist group, however, is located in one cluster (ArbInfl),
and the remaining was split among the other clusters. Similarly, the majority of rationalist group
belongs to one cluster, ArbSch. Only the Tanweeri group was spread among all clusters.
In addition to the Tanweeri and Rationalist bridge accounts, there are also Atheist and Theist
bridge accounts. For instance, AtheistGhost follows and retweets tweets posted by accounts from
groups holding different beliefs. Analysing the timeline content and following relationships for this
account shows tweets about supporting Palestine, opposing internal policies and regional relations
for some Arab countries, and discussing regional conflicts. Discussing these topics causes huge
interactions from supporters and opponents of each topic.
Other accounts that play a bridge role between religious and non religious groups such as
z3bdal5l5, arabs_exmus and Fawazintheflesh. The first account claims that it belongs to an ex-
Atheist, and the latter two are atheists who argue against religion and mainly criticise the main
three monotheist religions Islam, Christianity and Judaism. In addition, the theist group contains
some accounts that criticise other religions which again causes intensive interaction from atheists
and rationalists with theists.
5.2 The Retweet Network
Here we discuss the retweet network, which includes the accounts that are retweeted by our seed
list.
Figure 3 shows the network representation of the retweet network among our seed accounts
themselves (3a), and among our seed list and their retweet network (3b). The codes used in Figure 3b
are explained in detail in Table 6, where each cluster is described by the main theme characterising
the accounts in it. Table 7 shows the distribution of our seed list among the five clusters obtained
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Cluster Theme Description
TheiPro Theists and Muslim Scholars Islamic Scholars and influential Arabs
AthPro Atheists & Discussion of Religion Arab accounts with ties to groups that are critical of
religion
RelDis Discussing theists Prominent Arabs discussing theists and demanding secu-
lar communities
ArbInfl Arab influential accounts Arab influential users which do not discuss reli-
gions/atheism
NonArab Non-Arabic accounts Groups with ties to Non-Arabic accounts
Table 6. Maps From Clusters Codes to The Corresponding Theme of Retweeting Community
Cluster Total Seed list Non-Seed
size Atheist Rationalist Tanweeri Theist list
TheiPro 1034 5 (0.5%) 320 (30.9%) 16 (1.5%) 64 (6.2%) 629 (60.8%)
AthPro 963 213 (22.1%) 4 (0.4%) 16 (1.7%) 67 (7.0%) 663 (68.8%)
RelDis 989 276 (27.9%) 15 (1.5%) 16 (1.6%) 81 (8.2%) 601 (60.8%)
ArbInfl 844 20 (2.4%) 67 (7.9%) 23 (2.7%) 99 (11.7%) 635 (75.2%)
NonArab 649 218 (37.1%) 18 (3.1%) 0 (0.0%) 5 (0.9%) 347 (59.0%)
Table 7. Distribution of Accounts Retweeted by dataset Accounts
in Figure 3b.
TheiPro: Theism promoting accounts. The first cluster group, TheiPro, includes cross Arabs and
international Islamic scholars (e.g. alqaradawy, abdulaziztarefe, Dr_alqarnee, and salman_alodah),
Muslim priests/activists (e.g. shugairi, AbdullahElshrif, and amrkhaled), political specialists and
academies with Islamic backgrounds (e.g. DrAlnefisi, LoveLiberty), Arabic activists (e.g. TawakkolKa-
rman), Islamic institutions that promote Islam and oppose atheism (takweencenter, braheen_center
and islam_atheism). Interestingly, this group, while containing many popular Arabic Islamic schol-
ars/activists, does not have many of our Theist seed list, while having the majority of the Rationalist
accounts. This shows that Rationalists still retweet a lot of theist (Islamic in specific) content.
Despite the emphasis on religious content, the cluster also includes accounts of a more general
theme, such as Arabic infotainment accounts (e.g. TheArabHash), Arabic news source (AJABreaking,
AJArabic, ajmubasher, RassdNewsN, aa_arabic), Arabic journalists and TV presenters (kasimf and
Omar_Almulhem), Academic figures, mainly from Saudi, and Some governmental bodies such as
SaudiMOH and Saudi_FDA.
AthPro: Atheism promoting accounts. AthPro includes large portion of the atheist accounts in
our seed list, and contains other external accounts that promote atheism and criticise religions
(mainly Islam) whether they are popular (e.g. hamed_samad); not widely popular individuals (e.g.
DrTalebJawad), pages (e.g. AtheismAcademy), and public figures who actively criticise religions
without a clear position towards atheism (e.g. NawalElSaadawi17). Also, we find infotainment
and news source (e.g. ajplusarabi), Scientific accounts (SciTalk2U, IBelieveInSci), journalists and
TV shows presenters Arabs (jaafarAbdulKari), international news source in Arabic (AlarabyTV
and BBCArabic), international organisations in Arabic (Unarabic), and few Israeli accounts (e.g.
EdyCohen, Israelipm_ar and IsraelArabic).
7It worth mentioning that the holder of this account is a popular Egyptian feminist and has passed away in Match 2021 [47].
Most Atheist accounts and some of the Rationalist and Tanweeri accounts in our seed list have changed their profile picture
to her photo in condolences of her death.
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RelDis: Discussion of Religion. RelDis group also includes a large potion of the atheist accounts
in our seed list, but external accounts that criticise Islam and Muslim communities in specific.
It contain Symbolic accounts for a historical sceptical figures (e.g. abn_alrawndi), Non public
Atheist users, Saudi feminist accounts (hw_saudiwomen), public figures demand atheist com-
munity and criticise revealed religions (squemny), public figures demand secular societies (e.g.
Azizalqenaei and ElBaradei [52]), writers and journalists from different Arab countries such as
abdelbariatwan (Palestine), FatimaNaoot (Egypt), AhlamMostghanmi (Algeria), Egyptian news
source (Shorouk_News, youm7 and AlMasryAlYoum), international news sources broadcast in
Arabic (Rtarabic, dw_arabic, cnnarabic and France24_ar), international organisations (hrw_ar), and
Israeli account (AvichayAdraee).
ArbInfl: Influential Arabic Accounts. The ArbInfl group includes many Arab influencer accounts
with no specific stance towards religion. It includes royal family members from Saudi and Emirate
(KingSalman and MohamedBinZayed), Arab government bodies and personnel mainly from Saudi
and UAE such as MOISaudiArabia, AdelAljubeir and Dhahi_Khalfan. football clubs (realmadridarab,
Alhilal_FC), current and former cross-Arabs football players (MohammedAlDeaye and MoSalah),
accounts from different backgrounds such as Arabic official news source (spagov and AlArabiya),
Non official Saudi news sources (sabqorg, and News_Brk24), infotainment (TheTopVideo and
I_9mile). Interestingly, this cluster has the largest number of Theists accounts from our seed list.
NonArab: Non-Arabic and Western. NonArab group is very similar to the nonArab group from
the follow network, where large portion of the atheist accounts in our seed list are in this cluster. It
contains mainly popular Western politicans (realDonaldTrump, BarackObama, JustinTrudeau and
Nigel_Farage), and persons (BillGates), Arab immigrants to west (Ayaan), Non-Arab atheist immi-
grants to west (YasMohammedxx and MaryamNamazie), Western atheists (BillNye, SamHarrisOrg),
Western organisations and scientific (hrw), Western news sources (dwnews), non-Arab journalists
(nailainayat), non-Arabs immigrants to West (TarekFatah, MaajidNawaz), news sources boradcasted
in non-Arabic language (AJEnglish, AlArabiya_Eng), and Israeli politicians (netanyahu).
Echo Chambers and Bridges. The general observation from Figure 3a is very similar to the ones
from the follow network, where atheist group and the theist group are quite apart from each other,
while the Tanweeri and Rationalist groups are spread between them. However, atheist are clearly
split into two retweeting groups, each retweet almost exclusively to themselves. In addition, it can
be noticed that some rationalist accounts retweet more for atheist group.
5.3 The Mention Network
Finally, in this part we analyse the mention network, that includes the accounts that are mentioned
the most by our seed list accounts. The mention interaction means that the screen name of the
account is included in a tweet whether as a replied to or mention. This network reflects the
discussion within and among groups. Unlike follow and retweet networks which might be more
indicative of agreement between connected nodes, mention network can show links between
opposing views.
Figure 4 shows the network representation of the mention network among our seed accounts
(4a), and among our seed list and their mention network (4b). The colour codes used in Figure 4b
are explained in detail in Table 8, where each cluster is described by the main theme characterising
the accounts in it. Table 9 shows the distribution of our seed list among the four clusters obtained
in Figure 4b.
Table 10 shows the top five discussion topics in each cluster, derived using LDA. In addition, we
show samples of tweets from each cluster in Table 11.
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(a) The mention connections among our seed ac-
counts. Nodes colors represent each group in our
dataset.
(b) The mention network with nodes colors repre-
sent different clusters obtained based on modu-
larity
Fig. 4. Visualisation of the mention connections among our data set and their network, including only
accounts mentioned by 20 or more of the seed list. Description of cluster names is provided in Table 8
Cluster Theme (name) Description
RelDis Discussion group Arab theists, atheists and secularists groups, linked more strongly to
tanweeri and rationalist Arabs
ArbInfl Arab influential users Group includes Arab influential accounts theist promoters (mainly
Muslims) and Islamic scholars.
ArbAth Arabic Atheists Arab atheists and secularists that interact more with Arab theists
NonArab Non-Arabic & Western Non-Arabic accounts in which the majority criticise religions
Table 8. Cluster Themes for the Four Major Groups in the Mention Network
Cluster Total Seed list Non-Seed
Size Atheist Rationalist Tanweeri Theist list
RelDis 2291 243 (10.6%) 83 (3.6%) 24 (1.0%) 98 (4.3%) 1843 (80.4%)
ArbInfl 2059 106 (5.1%) 152 (7.4%) 40 (1.9%) 178 (8.6%) 1583 (76.9%)
ArbAth 1327 224 (16.9%) 59 (4.4%) 8 (0.6%) 123 (9.2%) 913 (68.8%)
NonArab 1057 199 (18.8%) 1 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 19 (1.8%) 838 (79.3%)
Table 9. Distribution of Accounts Mentioned by dataset Accounts
RelDis: Discussion of Religion. The group RelDis includes mainly personal accounts that question
religious actions. An account published a tweet ‘I will not name my baby as Islamic name such as
Muhammad, Omar or Ali, nor Christian name such as George or David. I want him to know God
without endorsing any religion’. The main topics discussed with this group are Metaphysics, the
religious-legislation and rationalism, social relationships, and religions and atheism. Some of these
topics are illustrated in the tweets 13 and 14 which show rejection of religions, 12 which discuss
the freedom of choice in Islam, and 15 which is a sample of tweets that discuss legislation.
ArbInfl: Influential Arab users. The ArbInfl cluster includes accounts of famous Arab influential
users from different backgrounds. This includes professionals and academics, Islamic scholars,
journalists, government and key government officials and football players, trainers and clubs. By
considering the topics extracted with LDA model, as shown in Table 10, we notice that ArbInfl
accounts are usually mentioned in the context of ideas and interactions as in tweets 1 and 3 from
Table 11, wars and conflicts within countries and mainly in the middle east as shown in tweet 4,
social interactions, and women’s rights as shown in tweet 3. Tweet 3 might not be clear, but it is a
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Topic ArbInfl ArbAth RelDis NonArab
1 Ideas and interactions Religions and conflicts Metaphysics Bigotry and prejudice




3 social life Freedom Relationships Ex-Muslims
4 Middle East and reli-
gions






5 Women’s rights Development of soci-
eties
Personal interests Women’s rights
Table 10. The Topics discussed in tweets with the top mentioned members as extracted with LDA
harsh reply to a tweet that complains about a fatwa that allows women to visit graves, which is
not permissible in Islam. The complain to the fatwa, which some says it eases the restrictions of
women’s freedom, was written by a female account; while, the reply, tweet 3, which endorses the
fatwa is written be a male account as they both describe themselves.
ArbAth: Arabic Atheists. The vast majority of ArbAth cluster accounts are non-public and personal
accounts from different beliefs. The main topics discussed within the tweets that mention accounts
from this groups are religions and religious conflicts, Islam and Islamic law, personal freedom,
religions in the Middle-East and development of societies. We can see such topics in the sample
tweets in Table 11 in addition to other tweets that discuss freedom, and development of societies
such as: ‘They used to forbid music and photography, and now they both are permissible. They said
women will never drive a car, and now women can drive. Now they say secularism is a disbelief,
but it is rooted in the culture!’. Another tweet that talks about the conflict in the Middle-East. The
tweet ‘I never authorise anyone to concede or even to negotiate on behalf of me, my rights and the
right of my offspring in this country’ which show a position towards the Arab-Israel conflict.
NonArab: Non-Arabic and Western. The main topics of discussion in this cluster are relevant to
bigotry and prejudice, the prophet of Islam, Jesus Christ and Christianity, ex-Muslims, rationalism
and secularism within the communities, evolution, and women’s rights. Tweets in the Non-Arab
group are generally part of long threads that discuss these topics, and some of them mention widely
known atheists from the West.
Tweet 13 in Table 11 is taken from a discussion of evolution and Islam between two non-Arab
accounts, both of which accuse each other of irrationality. The topic related to Ex-Muslims is widely
discussed within the non-Arab group including the tweets number 14 and 15. Tweet 14 is part of a
thread that claims that it is vital to have more Ex-Muslim atheists, which was instigated by a tweet
from Richard Dawkinsm the UK biologist and atheist, about ex-Muslim atheists.
Echo Chambers and Bridges. While the mention network shown in Figure 4a has the fewest
clusters (4), it clearly highlights an additional echo chamber that was not as clearly visible in
the follow and retweet networks. There is a clear divide between a small portion of the Atheist
group, which corresponds to the mention cluster NonArab, and the other three mention clusters,
RelDis, ArbInfl, and ArbAth. Indeed, NonArab is almost isolated from any discussion with other
Arab groups, including vocal atheists. Within the other three clusters, the atheist and theist echo
chambers we saw in the follow and retweet networks become a lot more porous in the mention
network. This means that within the Arab world, all four groups clearly interact with and react to
each other.
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Group # src Tweet
ArbInfl 1 T @MohamadAlarefe I believe in Allah as I believe a polar bear lives in desert. I am an
atheist and I want to discuss with you.
2 T @user Here are 10 facts about the universe that are mentioned in the Qur’an; How did
Muhammad knew about it?
3 T @user @user @SaudiNews50 Hey you! go and bury yourself, the lives of others are not
your business.
4 T @user @AJArabic Your dream has finished (ISIS), terrorism is in constant loss, now
Mosul; and Raqqa in the future.
ArbAth 5 T @user I am a Saudi, Sunni and Muslim girl from Makkah (Saudi Arabia). My ancestry
returns to the cousin of Islam prophet Muhammad. I left Islam because of the discrimi-
nation against women in Islam.
6 T @user women are the ones who suffer from this religion (Islam).
7 T @user @user @user What is the evidence that there is a day of the Resurrection?
8 T @user Leaving Islam is an act of sense.
RelDis 9 T @user @user What a mind? she got out from the rubbish of Islam to enter the rubbish
of Christianity. It is better for her to become an atheist.
10 T @user It is just a nonsense that intimidate naive people to increase the religion followers.
11 T @user The first step to develop your family and country is removing Islam from the
legislative process. Legislative process must be based on the rational and ethical thoughts
not by a book that was found 1400 years ago.
12 T @user @user Music to stay and growing. (criticising ISIS supporters claim ’Here to stay
and growing’).
NonArab13 P @user@user@user I have noticed that when you get stuck, you turn around by claiming
that you hate Ahmadiyya. Please leave feelings out of our discussion.
14 P @user @RichardDawkins Here I am, an Ex-Muslims
15 P @user @user @user @realDonaldTrump Read the book "Why I am not Muslim" by a
fellow ex-Muslim.
16 O An atheist Muslim on what the left and right get wrong about Islam @aliamjadrizvi
Table 11. Samples of the discussion tweets in each cluster including some of the top mentioned accounts.
"T" indicates tweet is translated from Arabic, "P" indicates tweet is in English, but has been paraphrased to
protect the user’s privacy, and "O" indicates original English tweet is shown
5.4 Summary of observations and intersections among networks
In this part, we present a summary on the connections between our seed list and the clusters of
users they connect to for the three networks we discussed earlier. In addition, we examine the
mapping between the different obtained clusters in each of the networks. We check the common
accounts among these networks to see how each cluster in each of the interaction networks might
map to the other clusters in the other ones.
Figure 5 shows the summary of interactions between our seed list and the cluster communities
obtained from each network: follow (Figure 5a), retweet (Figure 5b), and mention (Figure 5c).
In addition, we show the common accounts between the obtained clusters in each network in
Figure 5d.
As could be noticed, especially from Figure 5d, that the religion discussion cluster in the mention
network maps mainly to the religion discussion in the follow network with some members of the
other clusters as well. Also, it maps mainly to the AthPro cluster in the retweet network and still
connects to most of the other clusters. This also applies to the ArbInfl cluster in the discussion
that maps to most of the other clusters in the other networks. The general finding here is that
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(a) Following Interactions (b) Retweeting Interactions
(c) Mentioning Interactions (d) Intersection Between Networks
Fig. 5. Summary of network interactions
while there are echo-chambers in the follow and retweet networks, especially between atheists
and theists, the mention network comes to show that these different echo-chambers connects over
discussions through mentioning and replying each other.
The very obvious echo-chamber from Figure 5d is in the nonArab cluster in all the three networks
that almost fully map to each other. This shows that the Arab atheists that connects to the non-Arab
and western accounts follow, retweet, and reply accounts from outside the Arab world and almost
has no interaction with the Arab users, including the other Arab atheists.
In the following section we discuss these findings from the network analysis and link it back to
the RQs of our study.
6 DISCUSSION
In this paper, we investigated three research questions:
(1) What are the relevant communities of Twitter users, and where do they fall on the spectrum
of religiosity?
(2) Do these communities form echo chambers or they have bridges between them?
(3) What is the nature of the networks that each of these religion-related communities interact
with?
To answer the first question, we investigate how Arabs from different religious backgrounds
use Twitter to reflect their beliefs, promote it or criticise other beliefs, and if they participate in
religious discussions. To this end, we created a list of seed accounts that openly mention their belief
or non-belief in their account name or Twitter bio. We used four categories to describe user groups,
Theist (regardless of religious affiliation), Atheist (including agnostics and Deists), rationalists
(both religious and non-religious) and Tanweeri. These groups differ not only by their attitude to
organised religion, but also by their epistemological positions. While most users are committed to
either atheism or theism, overall, we observe the full spectrum of religiosity and non-religiosity
that the literature would lead us to expect.
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To answer the second and third question, we investigated the follow network (i.e., network of
accounts followed by the seed accounts), the retweet network (i.e., network of accounts retweeted
by the seed accounts), and the mention network (i.e., network of accounts retweeted by the seed
accounts). Surprisingly, the clearest divide across all three networks is not between theists and
atheists, but between atheist Twitter users who mainly interact with Western accounts and Twitter
users of all four groups that have strong links to Arab Twitter in general. When looking at the
follow and retweet networks, we find additional clear evidence for polarisation along the expected
religious lines. Atheists and theists tend to follow and retweet accounts that have similar attitudes
to religion.
In the follow and retweet networks, atheists split into three groups. In addition to those that
mainly engage with Western accounts (NonArab), there are atheists who engage in active debate
with theists and argue for secularisation (RelDis), and atheists who mainly engage with atheists
in their own community (AthPro, ArbAth). Theists tend to follow, retweet, and mention accounts
that are well known and influential in the Arab world, including government, news sources, and
popular figures.
The atheist-dominated clusters that focus on the Arab community also include public figures,
news sources, sports clubs, international organisations, and accounts that talk about science. In the
Follow network, atheist, theist and rationalist accounts are connected almost equally to ArbInfl
and News.
In all three networks, Rationalists and Tanweeri act as a bridge. These accounts are distributed
between the main two communities with more accounts on the atheist end of the spectrum. Notably,
rationalists are the group that is most likely to engage with Islamic scholarship.
6.1 Implication for HCI and CSCW
The social and cultural norms and practices of religions are often deeply embedded in the lives
of those that practice them, and affect every part of life, from wellbeing [58] to engagement with
technology [49, 55]. They will also affect those that live in areas where these religions are dominant.
Indeed, the lens of religious practice and discourse has been used to critique dominant discourses
in HCI [11].
Our findings illustrate that the study of religious polarisation cannot be separated from culture.
Regardless of their attitude to religion, Rationalist, Tanweeri, Theist, and many Atheist users are
deeply rooted in their communities. They pay attention to (follow network), amplify (retweet
network) and interact with (mention network) local news, journalists, political figures, sports clubs
(in particular football) and other public figures. This is also reflected in the topics extracted using
LDA. The three groups that are rooted in the Arab world, ArbInfl, ArbAth, and RelDis, feature
at least one topic that is relevant to society and life in general, whereas the discussion topics of
NonArab (including bigotry and prejudice) are focused clearly on religion-related issues.
The interactions between theist accounts and those whom they follow and retweet indicate a
space where Muslims can safely discuss issues linked to practising their religion in the context of
the modern world [4, 35, 51]. Non-religious Arab accounts indicate a space where those practices
themselves are critiqued and reforms can be pushed and argued for. We suggest that analyses of
online discussion of contentious topics, such as women’s rights, might benefit from a nuanced
classification of the religious stance of the accounts involved. We hypothesise that rationalist
accounts, which, as we have shown, engage deeply with relevant scholarship, might play an
important role in making such discussions productive. Openly Tanweeri accounts may indicate
which relevant religious and secular reforms are currently being discussed in the Arab world.
Online polarisation in Arab communities has previously mostly been studied in the context of
politics and radicalisation (e.g. [52]). While there is often an overlap between political stance and
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attitude to religion [20], it is counterproductive to reduce religious affiliation to political stance,
and vice versa. The Rationalist and Tanweeri groups on Arab Twitter provide important bridges
between the theist and atheist communities that might link discussions of reform in the atheist
context to communities who might be open to adopting such reformed practices. When considering
existing work on political polarisation, the role of these two groups highlights the importance of
designing techniques to bridge echo chambers between [31, 32].
Since religion is so intimately tied to people’s values and practices that it can affect uptake of
e.g. health interventions [58], the detailed network analysis performed here can be helpful when
researchers seek to leverage social media data to understand how people react to technology-
mediated services and products. The analysis may also be informative for those who seek to design
for user groups that differ in religious belief.
Finally, our analysis is strongly contextualised within Arab culture. In this, we follow recent calls
for HCI that acknowledges and incorporates cultural differences [7, 40]. The cultural knowledge
contributed by the Arab authors of this paper allows us to characterise the position of prominent
figures in the community, interpret the tweets within the discourse conventions of the Arab world,
and acknowledge the varied strands of thought that are often not seen from a Western perspective
which focuses on conflict and radical Islam.
In fact, our results show why cultural contextualisation is important. We identified an entire
subset of atheist discourse within Arab Twitter that is almost unmoored from the debates that are
going on in the rest of the Arab world. By interacting with Western atheist accounts, those Arab
atheists position themselves within the wider debate between Muslim theists and atheists that goes
beyond the Arab world itself. In order to understand this wider debate, however, we argue that we
need more studies which focus on specific Muslim majority and minority countries and regions.
The political and social situations in Turkey, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, or Indonesia, to
mention only a few countries with large Muslim populations, are quite different from each other.
Our study shows that online debate of religion versus non-religion benefits from the same in-depth
study that we afforded to the Arab world here. It would be interesting to see whether there are
similar differences between an atheist group that mainly interacts with the Western world and
atheist groups that interact with local communities, and whether there is evidence of theist and
atheist groups in dialogue across national and regional boundaries in the Muslim world.
6.2 Limitations
For reasons of protecting people with atheist leanings that are not public about it, our initial sample
was based only on public information that people publish online, i.e. the biography. However, some
of this information may be false. There are also parody accounts, which huge volume of interactions.
We also followed people’s self-description even in cases where their timeline might have led us to a
different judgement.
Most accounts have removed content whether by the account holder or by Twitter. Studying
the discussions, timelines contents and networks interaction in real-time would be richer and
more informative, but would not respect the Twitter users’ right to control which parts of their
timeline are accessible to the public or preserved as part of a putative research record. Removed
content, suspended and protected accounts cause a lot of incomplete discussions. Investigating
those requires a sensitive, qualitative approach, because account holders may have deleted this
information due to potential negative consequences for themselves.
Due to available resources, we limited the network analysis to accounts that had more than a set
number of followers or retweets. While this produces a cleaner data set that is easier to interpret, it
is possible that there are smaller sub-structures which we failed to detect due to lack of data.
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We acknowledge that due to our focus on atheism, the sample of Theist accounts is comparatively
small. We also did not divide Theist accounts according to the branch of Islam to which they belong.
We acknowledge that polarisation between Theists and Atheists on Arab Twitter needs to be
carefully contextualised within general religious discussion on Arab Twitter, but performing such
an analysis is unfortunately outside the scope of this study and remains as potential future work.
Finally, we focused on people’s attitudes towards religion, but we did not classify them according
to their own spirituality, and spiritual practices. This means that we were unable to accurately
represent Twitter users who are spiritual, but not religious; such people might fall into the Atheist
and Rationalist categories in this study.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have shown how an in-depth network analysis can be used to develop a nuanced
understanding religious polarisation between atheists and theists on Arab Twitter. We have high-
lighted both religious and cultural divides, and shown the importance of reformist (Tanweeri) and
Rationalist users in fostering productive discussion despite strong polarisation. In addition, we
have shown that analysing the mention/reply networks of users might give additional insights
about interactions between polarised online communities that might not been captured in their
retweet and follow networks.
While we have begun to examine the content of discussions between people with different
attitudes towards religion using LDA, the logical next step is a detailed content analysis. This would
allow us to see to what extent debates address current political and social issues in the Arab world,
and would also allow us to surface humour and satire, which clearly play a part in the discussion.
We also require a closer reading to identify references to spirituality or “personal religion”, and
its relationship to organised religion in Arab Twitter. This work is being planned in collaboration
with sociologists of religion, so that we can place our findings in the wider context of adherence to
religion and spiritual beliefs and practices.
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